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Abstract
There are two prominent accounts of the 2011 Arab Uprisings and the role of education in
youth mobilization. The first argument focuses on grievances: this hypothesis rests on a link
between educational attainment and youth job aspirations that the labor market has not been
able to fulfill. These unfulfilled aspirations fuel grievances and, hence, protest. The other
argument focuses on mobilization costs. The central hypothesis is that education provides the
skills, knowledge and/or contacts that facilitate political participation. This paper assesses and
attempts to disentangle these two accounts by examining the effect of education on measures
of grievance, political knowledge, and political participation using rich youth surveys from
Egypt and Tunisia. In order to partially deal with the endogeneity of education, we control for
parental education and sibling fixed effects. We find a strong and robust correlation of
education with political knowledge and political participation, but not with grievances.
JEL Classification: I2, F5
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ﻣﻠﺨﺺ
 ﺗﺴ ﺘﻨﺪ ھﺬه: وﺗﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﺤﺠﺔ اﻷوﻟﻰ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﻈﺎﻟﻢ. ودور اﻟﺘﻌﻠﯿﻢ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﺸ ﺒﺎب2011 ھﻨﺎك رواﯾﺘﺎن ﺑﺎرزﺗﺎن ﻋﻦ اﻟﺜﻮرات اﻟﻌﺮﺑﯿﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم
 ھﺬه اﻟﺘﻄﻠﻌﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻢ.اﻟﻔﺮﺿ ﯿﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺼ ﻠﺔ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﺘﺤﺼ ﯿﻞ اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻲ وﺗﻄﻠﻌﺎت اﻟﺸ ﺒﺎب اﻟﻮظﯿﻔﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻢ ﯾﺘﻤﻜﻦ ﺳ ﻮق اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻘﮭﺎ
 اﻟﻔﺮﺿ ﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔ ھﻲ أن اﻟﺘﻌﻠﯿﻢ ﯾﻮﻓﺮ اﻟﻤﮭﺎرات. وﺗﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﺤﺠﺔ اﻷﺧﺮى ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻜﺎﻟﯿﻒ اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ. وﺑﺎﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج،ﺗﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﺗﻐﺬي اﻟﻤﻈﺎﻟﻢ
 وﺗﻘﯿﻢ ھﺬه اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ ﻣﺤﺎوﻟﺔ ﻓﺼ ﻞ ھﺎﺗﯿﻦ اﻟﺤﺠﺘﯿﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل دراﺳ ﺔ ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ. أو اﻻﺗﺼ ﺎﻻت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺴ ﮭﻞ اﻟﻤﺸ ﺎرﻛﺔ اﻟﺴ ﯿﺎﺳ ﯿﺔ/ واﻟﻤﻌﺮﻓﺔ و
 ﻣﻦ.اﻟﺘﻌﻠﯿﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺪاﺑﯿﺮ اﻟﺘﻈﻠﻢ واﻟﻤﻌﺎرف اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ واﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻛﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺨﺪام دراﺳﺎت اﺳﺘﻘﺼﺎﺋﯿﺔ ﻏﻨﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﺸﺒﺎب ﻣﻦ ﻣﺼﺮ وﺗﻮﻧﺲ
 ﻧﺠﺪ ﻋﻼﻗﺔ ﻗﻮﯾﺔ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﯿﻢ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻤﻌﺮﻓﺔ اﻟﺴ ﯿﺎﺳ ﯿﺔ. ﻧﺘﺤﻜﻢ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﯿﻢ اﻷﺑﻮي واﻷﺧﻮة اﻵﺛﺎر اﻟﺜﺎﺑﺘﺔ،أﺟﻞ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﺟﺰﺋﯿﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺗﺠﺎﻧﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﯿﻢ
. وﻟﻜﻦ ﻟﯿﺲ ھﻨﺎك ﻋﻼﻗﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻤﻈﺎﻟﻢ،واﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻛﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ
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1. Introduction
The political mobilization of youth in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has received
considerable academic attention in recent years. A common narrative has emerged from the
literature that emphasizes the role of political and economic grievances in fueling individual
protest activity (Costello, Jenkins, & Aly, 2015; Homan & Jamal, 2012; Lesch, 2014; Shaq,
Mason, Seybolt, & DeLuca, 2014). However, social movement theorists have generally
dismissed grievance-based theories of uprisings (Della Porta & Diani, 1999; Gurney &
Tierney, 1982; McCarthy & Zald, 1987; Smith & Fetner, 2010). Critics point out that according
to the grievance narrative, the more politically and economically marginalized would be more
active in political mobilization activities. This supposition does not hold up to empirical
investigation, as numerous studies found that “very few of the most deprived groups actually
engaged in protest” (Smith & Fetner, 2010). But even though scholars of social movements
have come to perceive grievances as a necessary but not sufficient condition for protest
(McCarthy & Zald, 1987), the grievance-dominated narrative of the Arab Spring persists.
Our study aims to evaluate what we refer to as the “grievance theory” in the context of the Arab
Spring in comparison to alternative explanations of what factors led to youth mobilization. To
do so, we explore the well-documented link between education and political participation. It
has become well accepted in the sociology and political science literature that a positive
relationship exists between educational attainment and involvement in civic and political
activities (Campante & Chor, 2012a). This relationship holds for both regular political channels
such as voting and unconventional channels such as protest (Burden, 2009; Gallego, 2010;
Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2007; Hillygus, 2005; Milligan, Moretti, & Oreopoulos, 2004;
Sondheimer & Green, 2010; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978) Studies of the Arab Spring in Egypt
and Tunisia correspond to the findings in the literature: the more educated a young person was,
the more likely they were to engage in revolutionary activities (Beissinger, Jamal, & Mazur,
2012; Sieverding & Ramadan, 2015).
A grievance-based explanation of the Arab Spring would need to show that the more educated
are more likely to be aggrieved, which would explain their higher rates of participation in
protests. There were various economic reasons for grievances among the educated on the eve
of the 2011 revolutionary movements. Low returns to investments in education (Krafft, 2013;
Nugent & Saleh, 2009; Salehi-Isfahani, Tunali, & Assaad, 2009; Rizk, 2016) and high
unemployment and underemployment among this population (Dhillon, Dyer, & Yousef, 2009)
translated into unfulfilled labor market aspirations and interruptions to key life transitions such
as marriage and family formation. Yet the idea that these grievances were more severe than
those experienced by uneducated youth living in or near poverty demands evaluation.
An alternative hypothesis that accounts for the education and participation link is the
“democratic values theory”. Initially formulated by modernization theorists (Lipset, 1959), the
main argument is that education instills democratic and pluralistic values such as support for
free speech and equal opportunity (Dee, 2004; Milligan et al., 2004) and that these values fuel
citizen demands for political reform. However, this hypothesis does not hold up in the context
of the MENA region as strongly as it does elsewhere. Diwan Diwan2016c finds that “educated
Arabs are much less emancipated by their education on political and social values compared to
their global peers”. Although many Arab Spring activists advocated for democracy, Diwan’s
findings suggest that formal schooling had little to do with the adoption of these ideals. Hence
the democratic values theory proves insufficient for understanding the mobilization patterns of
youth in the Arab Spring and is not tested in this work.
A final explanation, which we do investigate, is what we refer to as the “skill theory”. This
framework is derived from the structural approach to social movement theory, which
emphasizes the capacity of participants to engage in protest-related activities (Smith & Fetner,
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2010). A foundational concept in this thread of social movement theory is the idea of
mobilizing structures, understood as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal,
through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald,
1996). By organizing the resources of participants (such as time), mobilizing structures serve
to translate social grievances into demonstrations, sit-ins, marches, etc.
The seminal contributors to the mobilizing structures approach were heavily informed by social
movements in developed countries during the mid-twentieth century (McCarthy & Zald, 1987).
In this context, they examined highly formalized and increasingly professionalized social
movement organizations. Such formal apparatuses were limited on the eve of the Arab Spring.
Instead, online networks, including group and individual accounts on social media platforms,
provided a mobilizing structure that served to convert youth resources and dissatisfaction into
collective action (Breuer, 2016; Howard & Parks, 2012; Lynch, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson,
2012). Considering the concentration of mobilizing structures online, we should expect
disproportionate social engagement in these resources. Access requires a computer,
communication and literacy skills that the more educated may possess but the less educated
may not. Thus, we would expect greater turnout to protests among educated youth on the basis
of skills.
In an alternative interpretation of the link between education, skills, and protest, Campante and
Chor (campante2014people, see also campante2012arab, campante2012schooling) argue that
economic conditions affect an individual’s tradeoff between working and protesting. For youth
facing low rewards to education in the labor market, the opportunity cost of engaging in
political activism instead of working is low, which helps mobilize disaffected youth into the
streets. When a young person’s human capital is not well rewarded by the market, they choose
to apply their skills to revolution-based activities. Thus, Campante and Chor provide another
channel through which skills may be the primary factor in translating grievances into collective
action and protest.
Despite the relevance of the â€œskillâ€ and â€œgrievanceâ€ theories and the events they
seek to explain, empirical evidence supporting or negating them as drivers of the Arab Spring
is limited. This paper seeks to assess and disentangle the two hypotheses by analyzing the
effects of education on youth grievances, political knowledge and political participation in
Egypt and Tunisia. In order to do so, we analyze two rich data sets focusing on youth in these
countries: the 2009 and 2014 Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) and the 2012 World
Bank Tunisia Urban and Rural Youth Surveys. We focus on youth between 21 and 29 years
old.
Quantitative analysis that tests both theories has a practical relevance that goes beyond a purely
academic interest in the 2011 Arab uprisings. If the “grievance theory” is valid, the political
mobilization of highly educated individuals gives particular urgency to addressing the origins
of such grievances in the labor market or the education sector. However, if the “skill theory” is
correct, political activism by highly educated individuals need not be such a clear-cut signal of
underlying social problems. Individuals with lower education may be holding important
grievances that they are unable to articulate politically. These grievances thus remain latent and
possibly unaddressed. Of course, these theories are also not mutually exclusive, as education
may simultaneously generate grievances and impart skills for mobilization.
We operationalize grievances using questions on life satisfaction, happiness, and trust in the
state (satisfaction with the country, for the case of Egypt). In order to assess the “skill” theory,
we focus on questions regarding political knowledge. Finally, for political participation, we
consider voting in elections in both Tunisia and Egypt, as well as participation in the 2011
uprising for the case of Egypt. Voting behavior is not necessarily the way grievances will
manifest, but alternative measures were not available for Tunisia.
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Raw correlations between education and these indicators are informative but cannot be
interpreted causally. The theories we seek to assess attribute a causal effect to education;
however, data limitations prevent us from undertaking a genuinely causal approach such as
making use of policy changes to instrument for education (see (Pekkarinen & Pellicer, 2013)
and (Pellicer, 2016) for studies using such methodologies for Tunisia). Nevertheless, we try to
address one of the most important potential sources of bias - family background - by controlling
for parental education and by performing sibling fixed effects analyses.
We find strong correlations between education and political information as well as political
participation variables. Moreover, most of these correlations do not appear to be driven by
family background, since the coefficients are not very sensitive to the introduction of parental
education or sibling fixed effects. This provides support for the “skill” theory. In contrast, we
find little evidence supporting the link between education and grievances. Youth with high
educational attainment generally tend to be happier, more satisfied with their lives and more
satisfied with the status of their country compared to less educated youth, although these effects
tend to disappear once we control for family background. Moreover, when adding grievance
and political knowledge variables to a model including education, the coefficient on education
decreases, particularly with political knowledge, suggesting that part of the effect of education
is via political knowledge rather than grievances.
We perform some robustness tests on the basic result that education appears unrelated to
grievances. We consider the possibility that the education-grievances relationship is non-linear.
Evidence in (Assaad & Krafft, 2015) suggests that secondary school graduates, most of whom
pursued the vocational track, have lost the most over time in terms of public sector employment
opportunities, which were for the most part replaced by poor job prospects in the informal
economy (Assaad, 2014). However, even when focusing exclusively on secondary school
graduates, we find no evidence that this group displays the highest grievances. We also conduct
the analysis for older males in our sample (those between 26 and 29 years old). These are
arguably the ones most likely to suffer from education-related grievances, given that they are
almost certain to have finished studying and encountered the challenging labor market
environment. We find no evidence that the educated among them are less satisfied. Ultimately,
our results are in line with current conventional wisdom attributing more explanatory power to
opportunity-based accounts of violence and protest than to “grievance-based” accounts (see for
instance (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003)).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the empirical approach.
Section 3 presents the results and section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2. Data and Empirical Approach
2.1 Data
We use the 2012 World Bank Tunisia Household Surveys on Youth in Urban and Rural Areas
(THSYUA and THSYRA) and the 2009 and 2014 Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE).
The THSYUA and THSYRA were actually administered separately and some items in the
questionnaire differ between the two. Except for one question on political knowledge, we
choose variables present in both surveys. Both surveys contain a household module with
socioeconomic information and a special youth module to be answered by individuals from 15
to 29 years old with detailed questions on attitudes. In the THSYUA 4,214 households and
3,936 youth were sampled, while in the THSYRA 1,400 households and 1,396 youth were
sampled.
The SYPE was first fielded in 2009, prior to Egypt’s 2011 revolution. The 2009 round included
15,029 youth aged 10-29 (Population Council, 2011). The post-revolution second round was
fielded in 2013/14 and successfully tracked 72% of the 2009 sample, a total 10,916 youth
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(Roushdy & Sieverding, 2015). Sample weights, which reflected the sampling strategy in 2009,
were updated in 2014 to account for attrition. In both the 2009 and 2014 rounds, household
data were collected, as well as information from individual youth. In the youth questionnaires,
there are detailed modules about educational experiences, political participation, and opinions.
In the 2013/14 round, there are specific questions relating to the revolution.
2.2 Variables
We restrict our attention to concepts that can be captured by the surveys in the two settings in
a reasonably homogeneous way. The data appendix provides a full account of all variables,
including the original survey questions and their possible responses, as well as our coding of
the relevant variables. To capture the concept of grievances, we use life satisfaction, happiness
and attitudes towards the state. Of the three variables, happiness is possibly the least clearly
related to grievances. We keep it because it is the only one present in the 2009 SYPE data set.
The questions on life satisfaction and attitudes towards the state in the Egyptian survey are
somewhat unusual. For the 2014 SYPE, these questions are part of a module on community
values and are asked explicitly in reference to the major political events in Egypt in recent
years. Specifically, the three questions ask about life satisfaction before the 25th January
revolution, from January 25th, 2011 to June 30th, 2013 (when former president Mohammed
Morsi was ousted), and since June 30th, 2013. Three further questions cover the same periods,
but ask about satisfaction with the state of the country instead of life satisfaction. Because these
questions target such specific political situations, we believe that they can be misleading as
measures of general satisfaction. This is particularly so given that we seek to test theories that
deal with socioeconomic grievances, and not exclusively political ones. We thus simply take
as measure for satisfaction the average of the satisfaction variables in the three periods, whether
it be referring to life satisfaction or satisfaction with the country. In contrast, in the Tunisian
survey, questions about life satisfaction and attitudes towards the state are more standard. The
life satisfaction question simply asks the extent to which one is satisfied with oneâ€™s life.
The question on attitudes towards the state is part of a battery of questions asking about trust
in various institutions, one of which is the state.
For political knowledge, we use two indicators: one on self reported knowledge of politics, and
another on “objective” political knowledge. The latter asks a question of political knowledge
(voting age in Tunisia, and the name of the governor of the respondent’s governorate in Egypt)
and codes whether the answer is correct or not.
Finally, for political participation, we use questions on voting and, for Egypt, on participation
in protest events or related activities connected with the revolution. On voting, questions are
slightly different across surveys. The Tunisia surveys ask about voting for the 2011 Constituent
Assembly elections. For the 2014 SYPE, there are questions on voting in different elections.
We use the one we consider most comparable to the Tunisian one, the parliamentary election
rounds of 2011/2012. For 2009, the situation is obviously very different and so is the question,
which is about having ever voted previously.
It is particularly fortunate that for Egypt there is information on participation in the January
25th revolution. There are questions on participation in different types of activities, such as
participation in party meetings, or providing support for protesters. We create a participation
variable equal to one if the respondents participated in any of these activities (except for
participation in security-related night watches, which can be considered a non-political
activity). The SYPE 2014 also asks respondents about whether family and friends participated
in the revolution. This is potentially a superior variable to reports of own participation in a
political context that was increasingly characterized by repression and a criminalization of
protest activity. We therefore complement variables on respondent participation with measures
of the participation of friends as well as respondent support for the revolution.
5

Our main explanatory variable is education. We consider levels of education and define three
categories: less than secondary, secondary, and university. If a respondent had completed at
least one year at a level, but not necessarily completed the entirety of the level, they were
incorporated into that category. The secondary category includes vocational secondary, general
secondary and lower secondary (typically years of education 6 to 9) in the two countries. The
university category includes any post-secondary education. We restrict our sample to those
over 21 years old to make sure that individuals would have already enrolled in higher education
if they were going to do so.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table ?? provides the summary statistics of our samples. The results appear sensible, picking
up well-known differences between Egypt and Tunisia, such as the slightly greater youth
educational attainment in Tunisia (Krafft and Alawode, 2016), or later ages at marriage and
more nuclear households (Assaad, Ghazouani, and Krafft, 2016, Salem, 2015) leading to a
higher incidence of being the son or daughter of the household head in Tunisia. It is important
to note that the outcome variables are not strictly comparable across countries, for the exact
question asked in each country differs. Another important point to note is the high number of
missing values in the parental education variables of the Tunisian sample. This reflects, partly,
the fact that in this survey parental education is not available when parents do not live in the
same household as their children, but also a relatively high prevalence of genuine missing
values. The table also makes clear the aforementioned discrepancy between respondents in
Egypt in 2014 reporting that they have actively participated in the revolution and those that say
that their close friends and family did.
2.4 Empirical approach
Our main empirical approach is straightforward. We use a simple linear probability model and
estimate it using OLS with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. In the basic
specifications, we control for sex, a full set of age dummies, governorate dummies, birth order
dummies and a rural/urban indicator. When attempting to control for family background, we
use two approaches. First we control for parental education. Second, we restrict the sample to
households with more than one child over 21 with different education levels and perform a
regression with sibling fixed effects on this sample.
These two approaches can generate sample selection problems. Because education can causally
affect decisions to leave the parental household, parental presence in the household is
endogenous. Controlling for variables related to respondents remaining in their parental
household might therefore yield results that are difficult to interpret. The age at which
individuals typically leave their household also varies across countries and by background.
Among recent generations in Egypt, female median age at marriage has been around 21 and
male median age at marriage around 26. In Tunisia, the female median age has tended to be 27
and the male median age around 32 (Krafft & Assaad, 2016). Additionally, more educated
individuals tend to marry later in both countries (Assaad, Ghazouani, & Krafft, 2016; Salem,
2015). These patterns affect who remains in their natal households. As an example, suppose
that proceeding to university causes young women to delay marriage and leave the household.
Then, analyzing households with women over 21 and with different education can be
problematic. Comparing women with low and high education will be misleading, as the former
will be a selected sample in that they remained in their natal household despite not continuing
their education.
In our case, this is a problem particularly for Tunisia, where parental and sibling information
is restricted to those living in the household at the time of the interview. In Egypt, in contrast,
parental education was asked to all youth in 2014, regardless of whether the parents live in the
same household or not. Sibling fixed effects still require both siblings to be present in the same
6

household, but even then the problem is alleviated by the panel component of the survey: 21 to
29 year-olds in 2014 were 5 years younger in 2009, and many siblings can be matched as long
as they lived together in 2009 and were still observed in the 2014 round.
In light of these selection problems, we proceed as follows: (1) we show the basic results with
the full sample and with no controls for family background, (2) we show the results with the
restricted sample, but still without controlling for family characteristics, and (3) we provide the
results with both the restricted sample and the controls for family background. A comparison
between (1) and (2) illustrates the potentially problematic sample selection issue, whereas a
comparison between (2) and (3) illustrates the result of actually controlling for family
background.
3. Results
3.1 Basic results
Table ?? shows the basic regression results, without controlling for family background, for
Tunisia in 2012, and for Egypt in 2014 and 2009. Each column corresponds to a different
outcome variable. The table displays only the coefficients for education, with the omitted
category being primary or no formal education. All regressions control for the basic
characteristics mentioned above, such as age, gender, etc.
The first panel of the table deals with political participation. The two theories we are
considering both imply that education should be positively related to political participation,
particularly participation in the 2011 uprisings. The table shows that more educated individuals
are indeed more likely to be politically active. Education is positively related to voting in Egypt
in both 2014 and 2009 and in Tunisia. Moreover, for Egypt, education appears clearly
correlated with participation in the revolution, according to virtually all of the indicators we
use.
The second section of the table addresses the potential “grievances” channel. According to the
grievance theory, education ought to be linked with less happiness, lower life satisfaction and
more negative attitudes towards the country. This is not, however, what we observe in the table.
Results are often not statistically significant but generally seem to go in the opposite direction
than hypothesized, with more educated individuals displaying fewer grievances. The only
exception is satisfaction with (trust in) the state in Tunisia, which seems highest for individuals
with the lowest levels of education. Overall, individuals with more education do not appear to
be less happy or less satisfied with their lives.
Results on the “skill” theory are much more clear-cut and robust. Individuals with more
education consistently appear to display higher levels of political knowledge, and this applies
both to self-reported levels of knowledge as well as objective knowledge. This also holds true
for Egypt in both 2014 and 2009 and for Tunisia.
3.2 Potential bias from family background
The previous correlations could simply be driven by family background, if children of higher
socio-economic status parents obtain more education, display higher political involvement and
political knowledge, and report higher life satisfaction than those with lower socio-economic
status parents. In this section, we address this issue by controlling for family background, first
by controlling for parental education and then by including sibling fixed effects.
Tables ??, ??, and ??, show the results of this exercise. Given that controlling for parental
background results in a smaller, and therefore possibly selected, sample, we disentangle the
effect of the sample selection and that of the actual controls by including the results with the
selected sample but without the family background controls. For Tunisia, this applies to both
the parental education model and the sibling fixed effects model, whereas. For Egypt, the
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sample selection issue arises only for the sibling fixed effects model because information on
parental education is available for everyone.
Table ?? considers political participation. For Egypt, results are remarkably robust. Neither
controlling for parental education, nor restricting the sample to those with siblings with
different education, nor actually controlling for sibling fixed effects in that sample substantially
alters the coefficients, although results sometimes become insignificant. This applies for voting
as well as for our different indicators of participation in the 2011 revolution. For 2009, results
for voting eventually become insignificant when considering the sample of siblings, but this is
because of a decline in precision due to the loss of sample size rather than a reduction in the
coefficient size. For Tunisia, results are slightly less robust. Whereas the coefficient remains
essentially unchanged after controlling for parental education, it eventually becomes small and
loses significance once sibling fixed effects are included. In summary, whereas we can
confidently conclude that the role of education for political participation in Egypt is not due to
confounding by family background, conclusions regarding participation in voting in Tunisia
are less robust.
Table ?? considers grievances. In this case, coefficients generally become small and
statistically insignificant once we control for family background, and this applies to both
Tunisia and Egypt. Controlling for parental education does not affect coefficient estimates, but
sibling fixed effects do. In most cases this is a result of restricting the sample rather than
including the sibling fixed effects themselves. In any case, it appears quite clearly that there is
no regular pattern between education and grievances that can be discerned from the data.
Certainly, this evidence supports our overall conclusion that the data does not support the
grievance theory.
Finally, table ?? considers political knowledge. In this case, results remain quite strong even
after controlling for family background. As in the case of political participation, results are
particularly robust when it comes to Egypt, where for both objective and self-assessed
knowledge, and for both 2014 and 2009, coefficients remain large and statistically significant
despite controlling for family background. For Tunisia, again results are slightly less robust.
Whereas for objective political knowledge coefficients remain strong even with family
background controls, those for subjective knowledge drop to zero when sibling fixed effects
are included. However, the table shows that this is the result of the sample selection process
rather than the inclusion of the sibling fixed effects as such. Although, once more, the degree
of confidence in the Tunisian results is lower, it appears that overall political knowledge is not
driven by family background confounders.
These results imply that the associations between education and the various outcome variables
obtained above are not driven primarily by family background. The conclusions on grievances
also remain unchanged: it appears that education does not lead to less satisfaction even when
family background is taken into account. Of course, we still cannot claim that our results are
causal. It could well be that other biases induced by personal attributes such as ability, ambition
or motivation underlie the associations we observe. Nevertheless, we believe our analysis is an
important step forward in that it rules out one of the most important potential confounders.
3.3 Path analysis
Our initial hypotheses state that education affects political participation, either through
grievances or through the skills/knowledge pathways. Estimating the effect of education on
each of these outcomes is a transparent way of testing the model: if the grievance (skills) theory
is true, we ought to observe a positive relation between education and grievances (skills), and
a positive relation with political participation. Failure to observe any of this puts the theory
seriously in question.

8

This approach is, however, incomplete. Estimating each effect separately cannot address the
question of whether education leads to political participation because of its effects on
grievances or skills. A more satisfactory way of testing this would be to specify a structural
model with all these variables. However, in order to estimate such model convincingly, valid
instruments for all relevant endogenous variables would be needed. Using invalid instruments
leads to bias that can be larger than that of OLS. Since instruments for the different endogenous
variables are not available, we choose not to pursue this avenue.
A less comprehensive but also less demanding approach to test our hypotheses is to focus on
particular causal pathways and use simple sequential regressions to examine whether
coefficients of interest change as other variables are added into the model in accordance with
the hypothesis. In particular, we regress voting and participation for the revolution, first on
education (and controls) alone, and then separately add measures of grievance and of skills to
the model. The idea is that if education affects political participation via grievances (or skills),
the addition of a grievance (skill) measure ought to reduce the coefficient of education. Indeed,
at the limit, if all the effect of education on political participation occurred via grievances (or
skills), we would expect no correlation between education and political participation, once we
control for grievances (or skills). Again, such an approach would ideally utilize exogenous
variation in the variables of interest, which is not available to us. Hence, we take such an
approach as a heuristic exercise that, while not ideal, can nevertheless provide useful additional
insights. Our regressions are estimated by simple OLS, using the same controls as before,
including parental education. To obtain single measures of grievance and political knowledge,
respectively, we perform a principle component analysis on our multiple measures of each of
these two concepts. The variable we finally take as a proxy for each of the concepts is then
simply the first component of the principal component analysis. For the grievance measure we
reverse the sign of the component so that the variable captures grievance instead of satisfaction.
Table ?? shows the results of the exercise. The table includes analyses for four outcome
variables: voting in Tunisia, voting in Egypt, and participation in the revolution in Egypt. For
each outcome, the first column shows the coefficients for education alone, the second and third
columns add our index for grievances and political knowledge, respectively, and the fourth
column adds both grievances and political knowledge. The main insight from the table is that
the coefficient for education drops very little when we add the grievances proxy variable to the
model, but shrinks considerably when we add the knowledge proxy. The pattern is particularly
marked for Egypt. This is consistent with the results above, suggesting that part of the effect of
education on political participation occurs via political knowledge and not via grievances.
However, it is worth stressing that the coefficient for education remains fairly large even after
adding the knowledge variable to the models. This could be because education affects
participation via other skills and resources, or because our proxies for knowledge only measure
knowledge imperfectly.
One of the key mechanisms through which we expect education to link to mobilization is social
media skills. Additional analyses of the data (not shown) suggest such a relationship. In Egypt
and Tunisia, we find that for young people (ages 21-29), educational attainment and internet
use are positively linked, and in Egypt, more educated youth were more likely to see social
media as an â€œimportantâ€ resource for staying informed about the January 25th
Revolution. The findings suggest that educated youth with certain skill advantages had greater
access to mobilizing structures as compared to their less educated counterparts.
Another result from table ?? worth mentioning is that the grievance variable has a negative
(albeit small) coefficient in all regressions. That is, individuals with more grievances are less
likely to participate politically, controlling for education. This, again, reinforces the overall
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message that grievances do not appear to be primary drivers of political participation in this
context.
3.4 A further look at grievances
The above results suggest that there is no clear monotonic relation between education and
grievances. However, there are three reasons why these results may fail to capture the possible
role of grievances in political participation, especially protest activity. First, the relation
between education and grievances may be non-monotonic. Second, grievances may be
concentrated in particular demographic groups (for example, the older males in our subsample,
which are likely to have finished studying and have already faced a challenging the labor
market environment) and this may be diluted when considering the whole population of youth.
Third, grievances may have subsided after the respective revolutions, the period when most of
the data was collected.
We consider first the possibility that the relationship between education and grievances is more
complex than a simple monotonic relation. In particular, it may be that those with the most
education have not been the ones suffering the most from the retrenchment of public sector
jobs and are thus not the ones holding the strongest grievances. The coarse definition of
education used above may obscure this pattern. In fact, there are reasons to believe that, at least
for the case of Egypt, those with the highest grievances could be secondary school graduates
(most of whom would have pursued the vocational track). This education group appears to have
lost the most, as they formerly had guaranteed access to public sector jobs but no longer do
(Assaad, 1997; Assaad & Krafft, 2015). This is also the group for whom returns to education
have dropped the most and are currently close to zero (Krafft, 2013). The situation is not so
clear for Tunisia, where public sector employment guarantees did not exist.
In order to address this potential non-linearity, we re-examine the grievance-related outcomes
using as the explanatory variable a more refined measure of education, which breaks down
secondary schooling into lower secondary school (which never had public sector job
guarantee), vocational secondary, and general secondary tracks. We run the same analyses as
before for both Egypt and Tunisia even if for Tunisia no specific pattern is anticipated.
The results of the exercise are shown in Table ??. The omitted category is again primary or no
formal education. Again, the table does not display a very clear pattern. In particular, the
coefficients for vocational secondary are generally positive, even if mostly statistically
insignificant, contrary to the idea that this group holds the highest grievances. If at all, the table
suggests that individuals with the highest education levels, general secondary and with
university studies tend to be happier, more satisfied with life and with their country, although
the effects become small and statistically insignificant when considering sibling fixed effects.
The only exception is trust in the state in Tunisia, where the individuals with the least education
tend to have the highest levels, as we saw earlier.
All in all, it does not appear that the lack of a correlation between education and grievances
comes from ignoring the potentially non-linear nature of the relationship. Of course, this does
not mean that more educated individuals, or those specifically with vocational secondary
education are not the ones that have lost the most in terms of public sector employment
opportunities. However, this does not appear to translate directly into satisfaction or attitudes
towards the state, and this puts into question the relevance of the grievance hypothesis for
political mobilization.
Second, we consider whether grievances may be concentrated in specific demographic groups.
To this end, we rerun the analysis for males over 25. In our data, the sample of male siblings
over 25 with different educational attainment is very small, so we perform the analysis with
parental education controls, but without sibling fixed effects. Table ?? shows the results. Again,
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we do not observe any clear pattern of higher dissatisfaction for those with more education.
Generally coefficients are small and those that appear as statistically significant tend to be
positive. It appears that even among older male youth, education does not seem to be associated
with grievances.
The third potential concern, the fact that most results refer to post-2011 data, cannot be
addressed fully. The only piece of evidence in this regard is the information on happiness in
the 2009 Egypt survey. Results for this survey appear generally as inconclusive as the others,
although in some instances education coefficients do appear negative and sizable (although
never statistically significant). Overall, even when focusing on 2009, the grievance hypothesis
does not seem to garner significant support in our analysis.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this analysis, we investigated two alternative theories linking youth political activism to
education. The â€œskill theoryâ€ suggests that education provides useful skills for political
mobilization because of a greater ability among the educated to perceive political problems, to
transform grievances into action and to receive and transmit political knowledge to peers. The
â€œgrievance theoryâ€ suggests that education confers aspirations that are unfulfilled and
the resulting frustration and sense of grievance drive youth to political action. We attempted to
distinguish among these two theories in the context of the recent political mobilizations in
Egypt and Tunisia by examining the link between education and several political outcomes,
while controlling for both observable and unobservable family background characteristics. To
assess the grievance pathway, we use as measures of life satisfaction, happiness and trust in the
state, or satisfaction with the state of the country, as outcomes. To assess the skills pathway,
we use both objective and subjective indicators of political knowledge. Finally, we examine
the direct effect of education on political participation, which could be the result of either
pathway, by using a number of outcomes such as voting, participation in the revolution (by
respondent and by respondentâ€™s family or friends) and support of the revolution.
Unfortunately, the revolution-related outcomes are only available for Egypt and not Tunisia.
Our results support the link between education and political participation. Education is
positively associated with voting in Tunisia and in both waves of the SYPE survey in Egypt.
What seemed to matter in terms of voting behavior in Tunisia was having attending some type
of higher education, with secondary education having no statistically significant effect. We
acknowledge that voting may not be a quality proxy of political action, as voting has lower
costs and requires less human capital than other forms of political activity (Verba and Nie 1972,
Campante and Chor 2014). Education is also strongly associated with support for the revolution
in Egypt, and higher education appears to be strongly associated with either oneâ€™s own selfreported participation or that of family and friends (which we take as a strong proxy for
oneâ€™s own participation in a repressive political context where respondents might fear
reporting their own participation).
We attempt to account for potential confounders by including controls for parental education
as well as sibling fixed effects. Even then, the association between education and political
participation remains robust. In the case of Tunisia, the inclusion of parental education controls
involves restricting the sample to youth 21-29 still living with their parents, which cuts down
the sample by slightly more than half; this could result in sample selection bias. Nonetheless,
the positive association between higher education and voting persists in Tunisia after the
sample restriction and the inclusion of the parental education variables. The inclusion of sibling
fixed effects results in a further restriction to the sample to households with two siblings in the
21-29 age group. This results in a sample of just 428 youths, a mere 15 percent of the original
sample. The effect of education on voting in Tunisia disappears and becomes insignificant
when such a sample is used.
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In the case of Egypt, we do not need to restrict the sample to include controls for parental
education because such information is available for all youth in the SYPE survey, irrespective
of whether they still live with their parents. When parental education controls are included, the
association between education and voting, as well as the correlation between education and
support for the revolution is virtually unchanged. Similarly, the association between university
education and respondentâ€™s personal, family, and friend participation in the revolution is
also unchanged. The inclusion of sibling fixed effects does require a restriction of the sample
in Egypt as well, but because of the panel nature of the survey, it is sufficient to have the pair
of siblings living together in the same household in the early round of the survey (2009) to
identify them as siblings in the later round (2014). Even with the inclusion of sibling fixed
effects, the strong association between education and voting in Egypt remains robust in 2014,
but nearly disappears in 2009. On the other hand, the association between education and other
forms of political participation in Egypt (i.e. participation in the revolution and support for the
revolution) virtually disappears when sibling fixed effects are used.
In our attempt to distinguish between the two alternative pathways through which education
can affect political participation, our results point toward the skill rather than the grievance
hypothesis. In fact, we find that education, especially higher education, is positively associated
with the life satisfaction and happiness outcomes in both Egypt and Tunisia, casting doubt on
the hypothesis that the more educated harbor greater levels of grievances. These results are
robust to the inclusion of parental education controls in both settings and in both years in Egypt.
However, they are not robust when the sample is restricted to households with two siblings in
the 21-29 age range, which is likely reflection of the limited sample size rather than the
inclusion of the sibling fixed effects. The results on the trust in the state (in the case of Tunisia)
and the satisfaction with the state of the country (in the case of Egypt) are more mixed. In
Tunisia, education, and in particular secondary education, appears to have a negative effect on
â€œtrusting the stateâ€ : the results are robust, if not a bit stronger, with the inclusion of
parental education controls. This lends some limited support to the grievance explanation. In
Egypt, on the other hand, satisfaction with the state of the country, which is only measured in
2014, is positively associated with attaining higher education. Again, this result is robust to the
inclusion of parental education controls, but not to the inclusion of sibling fixed effects.
Support for the skill pathway is provided by the strong association between education and both
objective and subjective political knowledge in Egypt, even with the inclusion of parental
education controls or sibling fixed effects. The results for Tunisia are less robust. Although the
results excluding the family background controls show strong association between education
and political knowledge in Tunisia, when parental education variables are included in the
model, the association with objective knowledge becomes statistically insignificant. When
sibling fixed effects are included, the Tunisian results are statistically insignificant, potentially
because of the sample restriction involved rather than the inclusion of the fixed effects.
Arguing that educated youth are at least as satisfied with life as their less educated counterparts
is not tantamount to saying that low and decreasing economic returns to education in the Arab
World should be ignored. In fact, according to Campante and Chor (2014), it is the low
economic returns to education that lower the cost of political participation on the part of
educated youth, allowing them to channel more time and effort toward political mobilization.
Furthermore, our results do not say anything about whether grievances among educated young
people, who demonstrably have a greater capacity to mobilize than their less educated
counterparts, have increased over time and are thus playing a bigger role in political
mobilization.
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Data Appendix
Vote

Code

Tunisia
Did you elect in the
Constituent Assembly
elections? 1. Yes 2. No 3.
Underage
1=1

Egypt 2014
5505) Did you vote in the November 2011
January 2012 parliamentary elections round 1?
Yes (1) No (2)
1=1

Participate
revolution

5405) Think about the period since the start of
the January 25th revolution. Which of the
following activities did you take part in? A.
Participated in party meetings or activities Yes
(1) No (2) B. Donated money to a political
party or organization Yes (1) No (2) C.
Contacted politicians Yes (1) No (2) D.
Collecting signatures/Signed petitions Yes (1)
No (2) The Population Council-Egypt office
10 E. Participate in night watches to protect
your neighborhood. Yes (1) No (2) F. Provided
support to protesters Yes (1) No (2) G.
Participated in any kind of protest
demonstration. Yes (1) No (2) G.1 Where? H.
Joined a strike Yes (1) No (2) I. Used violent
forms of action Yes (1) No (2) J. Elections
campaigns Yes (1) No (2)

Code

1 = Yes to any except E

Support revolution

5422) Did you support the January 25th
revolution? (1) Yes (2) No
1=1

Code

5305) With 1 as being worst possible and 10
as being best possible, A. How do you feel
about your life before January 25th revolution,
B. How do you feel about your life from
January 25th 2011 to June 30th 2013, C. How
do you feel about your life after June 30th
2013
1 = average (A, B, C)

Satisfaction life

To what extent are you
satisfied with your life 1. Not
satisfied at all 2. Satisfied to
some extent 3. Neutral 4.
Satisfied enough 5. Very
satisfied 6. Not applicable

Code

1 to 5

Happiness

605) Do you feel unhappy? Yes (1) No (2)
Generally do you consider
yourself 1. unhappy at all 2.
happy to some extent 3. happy
enough 4. very happy
1 to 4
1=2

Code

605) Do you feel unhappy? Yes (1)
No (2)

1=2

5305) With 1 as being worst possible and 10
as being best possible, A. How do you feel
about the state of the country before January
25th revolution, B. How do you feel about the
state of the country from January 25th 2011 to
June 30th 2013, C. How do you feel about the
state of the country after June 30th 2013
average (A, B, C)

Satisfcation country

To what extent you trust in
the following institutions?
State A. No trust B. Low trust
C. Good Trust D. High Trust

Code

1 to 4

Knoledge subjective

How can you describe your
5416) To what extent do you agree with the
knowledge about the
following statements? I feel like I have a pretty
following? Politics 1. I don’t good understanding of the important political
know 2. Limited knowledge 3. issues which confront our society 1. Strongly
Good knowledge 4. Very
agree, 2. Agree, 3. Neither agree nor disagree,
good knowledge
4. Disagree, 5. Strongly Disagree
1 to 4
1 to 5

Code

Egypt 2009
459) Did you vote in any election in
the past? Yes (1) No (2) 460) Will
you vote/register and vote at the next
election? Yes (1) No (2)
1=1

Knoledge objective

What is the minimum age for 461) Do you know the name of the governor
voting in election?
of your governorate? Name: ————Correct (1) Wrong (2)

Code

1 = 18

1=1

461) Do you know the name of the
governor of your governorate?
Name: ————- Correct (1) Wrong
(2)
1=1
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
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Table 3: Basic Relationship between Education and Outcomes, Ages 21-29
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Table 4: Participation, with Family Background Controls

19

Table 5: Grievances, with Family Background Controls
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Table 6: Knowledge, with Family Background Controls
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Table 7: Path Analysis
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Table 8: Grievances, Detailed Education Levels, With Family Background Controls
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Table 9: Grievances, Males over 25, with Parental Education Control
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